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Abstract
What is the influence of syndicate organization on the duration of loan ar-
rangement? I answer this question using the survival analysis methodology
on a sample of loans from 59 countries over the 1992-2006 period. I find
that syndicate size, concentration, reputation, and national diversity clearly
matters for the duration of loan arrangement and therefore for borrower satis-
faction regarding the speed of obtaining the necessary funding. A syndicate
organization adapted to specific agency problems of syndication, with nu-
merous, reputable, and experienced arrangers retaining a larger portion of
the loan reduces the duration. The latter is also shorter when the lenders
diversity in terms of nationality is weaker.
Keywords : Syndicated loan, syndication process, duration of loan ar-
rangement, agency costs, reputation, experience, nationality, survival analy-
sis.
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1 Introduction
This articles investigates the influence of the organizational characteristics
of a bank syndicate on the duration of loan arrangement. The latter is
an important criteria of choice for the borrowers to apply for a syndicated
loan1, as the speed of obtaining the necessary funding is considered to be a
significant advantage of syndicated lending compared to bonds or a series of
bilateral loans.
Indeed, the impressive development of syndicated lending can be at-
tributed to its advantages, both for borrowers and lenders, such as portfolio
and sources of income diversification and more competitive pricing and more
flexible funding structure. Currently, syndicated lending became the major
corporate finance choice of companies, representing more than 50 percent of
external financing for US firms (Weidner, 2000) and more than one third of
the funds raised on the worldwide financial markets (Altunbas et al., 2005).
However, syndicated lending has also its drawbacks as it implies specific
agency problems due to informational frictions between the senior (arrangers)
and the junior (participants) members of the syndicate. Following the the-
oretical work of Pichler and Wilhelm (2001), recent empirical evidence sup-
ports the argument that an adapted organizational structure of the syndicate
(size, concentration, and composition) is a crucial feature to mitigate syn-
dication agency costs (Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Jones et al., 2005; Sufi,
2007). Syndicate organization has also an important influence on the pric-
ing of syndicated loans (Harjoto et al., 2006; Ivashina, 2007; Focarelli et al.,
1A syndicated loan is a loan defined by a single agreement in which several banks
participate.
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2008), on borrower’s wealth (Preece and Mullineaux, 1996), and on liquid-
ity risk management (Gatev and Strahan, 2008). Furthermore, the presence
of established and reputable lenders acting as information certifiers provides
substantial advantages to the borrowers (Goplan et al., 2007; Ross, 2007;
Panyagometh and Roberts, 2008). Overall, the organization of a syndicate
matters for the borrower, as it influences loan terms and his wealth.
However, the influence of syndicate organization on the length of the
syndication process (or loan arrangement duration), i.e. the time between
the launching of the syndication until the completion date, when the deal
becomes active, seems neglected in existing academic literature. This is sur-
prising because empirical evidence shows that the organizational structure
of teams have a significant impact on the speed of decision making (Eisen-
hardt, 1989; Talaulicar et al., 2005). The duration of loan arrangement is of
particular interest for the borrower for evident reasons related to the speed
of obtaining the funds. Indeed, this speed is one of the main advantages of
syndicated loans compared to other ways of funding such as bonds. During
the 1992-2006 period, the median of the duration of loan arrangement was
35 days, while the 5-th and 95-th percentiles were equal to 18 and 115 days
respectively2. For that reason, one of the main arguments driving the choice
of a bank that will arrange the syndication is its speed of action. The ar-
ranger is the key figure of a syndication because he is the privileged agent
in the relationship between the borrower and the syndicate. Thus, he is re-
sponsible for a crucial feature of an efficient and successful loan syndication:
the syndicate organization. The latter exhibited strong heterogeneity in the
2Author’s calculations on the Dealscan database (LPC, Reuters).
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last 15 years, as such characteristics as as size or concentration of arrangers
recorded average values from 3 to 6 and 15 percent to 25 percent respec-
tively3. Syndication-related agency problems can interfere with the duration
of loan arrangement, thus reducing one of the main advantages of syndicated
lending for borrowers. Hence, what is the influence of syndicate organization
on the duration of loan arrangement? And what are the characteristics of
syndicate organization that drive the duration of loan arrangement?
The aim of this article is to answer these questions. In particular, I am
interested in the influence of syndicate size, concentration, reputation, experi-
ence, and composition in terms of nationality on the duration of a syndicated
loan arrangement. Indeed, it is of utmost interest to empirically document
if syndicate organization influences the duration of loan arrangement, and
which characteristics are the most important to guarantee the shortest loan
arrangement. Such evidence is valuable for borrowers, because their satis-
faction is increasing with fast and efficient syndication, as well as lenders,
because their reputation is contingent on the duration of loan arrangement.
Finally, empirical evidence on the relationship between syndicate organiza-
tion and duration of loan arrangement adds to the growing literature on
syndicated lending.
To test the influence of syndicate organization on the duration of loan
arrangement, I employ accelerated failure time models on a sample of more
than 4, 800 syndicated loans from 59 countries during the period of 1992 −
2006. I use various measures of syndicate organization, such as size, measured
with the number of lenders and arrangers, concentration, measured with the
3Author’s calculations on the Dealscan database (LPC, Reuters).
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Herfindhal-Hirschman Index, reputation and experience, measured with the
presence and market share of the lead lenders, and composition in terms of
nationality.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the loan
syndication process and discusses various measures of syndicate organization.
Section 3 presents the accelerated failure time model methodology and the
data. Results are displayed and discussed in section 4. Finally, I conclude in
section 5.
2 Loan syndication process and syndicate or-
ganization
This section is devoted to the description of a typical loan syndication process
where duration is the central issue of this article. I also discuss syndicate
organization measures I take in my empirical design into account.
2.1 Loan syndication process
Bank loan syndication can be considered as a sequential process, which can
be separated into three main stages4. During the pre-mandated stage, after
soliciting competitive offers to arrange and manage the syndication with one
or more banks (usually its main banks), the borrower chooses one or more
arrangers that are mandated to form a syndicate and negotiates a preliminary
loan agreement. The syndication can be sole or joint mandated, the latter
4See Esty (2001) for a detailed presentation of the syndicated lending process.
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involving the participation of more than one lead bank5. The arranger is
responsible for the negotiation of key loan terms with the borrower, the
appointment of participants6 and the structuring of the syndicate. At this
stage, the arranger is responsible for placing the syndicated loan with other
banks and ensuring that it is fully subscribed. His compensation is mainly
composed of various fees (agency, arrangement, commitment, . . . ).
The post-mandated stage involves the placement of the loan. In that aim,
the arranger prepares a documentation package for the potential syndicate
members, called an information memorandum. It usually contains infor-
mation about borrower creditworthiness and loan terms. The initial set of
targeted participants is strongly determined by the arranger. Their previous
experience with the borrower, the industry sector or the geographic area are
strong drivers for being chosen by the arranger to join the syndicate. A road-
show is then organized to present and discuss the content of the information
memorandum, as well as to announce closing fees and establish a timetable
for commitments and closing. The participants can make comments and sug-
gestions in order to influence the structure and the pricing of the loan. After
the roadshow, the arranger makes formal invitations to potential participants
and determines the allocation given to each participant.
The third and last phase takes place after the completion date when the
deal becomes active and the loan is operational, binding the borrower and
the syndicate members by the debt contract. The latter sets out the terms
5Such syndications are usually chosen by the borrower in order to maximize the likeli-
hood of a successful syndication, in terms of loan characteristics, subscription and duration
of the syndication process.
6Participants lend a portion of the loan and receive a compensation essentially com-
posed of a spread.
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and conditions of the loan: the amount, the purpose, the period, the rate of
interest plus any fees, the periodicity and the design of repayments and the
presence of any security.
2.2 Agency problems and syndicate organization
Loan syndication involves several actors - the arrangers, the participants and
the borrower - and is a complex process involving specific agency costs and
recontracting risks.
Syndication-specific agency problems are of two types. First, the arranger
possesses more information about the borrower either because of the private
information collected through a previous lending relationship or through due
diligence. This private information creates an adverse selection problem as
the arranger may be inclined to syndicate loans from bad borrowers. Second,
the participant banks may delegate some monitoring tasks to the arranger in
charge of the loan documentation and notably of the enforcement of covenants
and collateral. As the efforts of the lead bank are unobservable for participant
banks, this results in a moral hazard problem that is exacerbated with the
opacity of the borrower. Another important issue is related to borrower’s
financial distress which handling is more complicated in a syndicate setting
because lenders must reach a collective decision (Bolton and Scharfstein,
1996). All of these problems affect the syndicate organization (Esty and
Megginson, 2003; Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Sufi, 2007; Panyagometh and
Roberts, 2008).
The main explanatory variables of interest are those related to the syn-
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dicate organization, which can be measured in various ways. The key figure
of a syndicate is the number and concentration of arrangers. The latter is
measured by computing the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index of the shares of the
loan retained by the arranger7 while the former corresponds to the number
of lenders bearing the “Arranger” title.
I expect the number and concentration of arrangers to have a negative
influence on deal arrangement duration. A larger syndicate “core” implies
better handling of agency problems related to monitoring of the borrower
as several delegated monitors are present. It also reduces adverse selection
problems related to private information that is now spread among several
arrangers (Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Jones et al., 2005; Sufi, 2007). Greater
arrangers’ concentration is more suited to cope with free-riding and moral
hazard problems, as well as with hold-up problems in case of borrower’s dis-
tress and subsequent reorganization and renegotiation (Esty and Megginson,
2003). Arrangers’ retained share of the loan provides a signal of their com-
mitment to efficiently monitor the borrower and can also be considered as a
device to align lenders’ incentives within the syndicate (Lee and Mullineaux,
2004; Sufi, 2007).
I also consider alternative measures of leadership in the syndicate with
a special focus on reputation, which brings a certification device regarding
the quality of the borrower and of the deal. Indeed, Goplan et al. (2007),
Ross (2007), Panyagometh and Roberts (2008) and Gatti et al. (2008) show
that certification by experienced, reputable, and prestigious arrangers creates
7When the syndicate has more than one arranger, I use the mean of the shares retained
by the arrangers.
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economic value by reducing overall costs of syndicated loans, and highlight
the importance of lender reputation in the loan syndication market. Top
10 lenders (presence) and Top 10 lenders (market) are variables based on
the percentage of the lenders in the syndicate who are in the top 10-th per-
centile distribution of the most frequent lenders and of the lenders having
the greatest market shares of the syndicated lending market respectively8.
These variables allow to focus on the experience and reputation acquired
in previous syndications. The distinction between presence and market share
provides a more detailed insight into the importance of being on the mar-
ket versus having greater shares of the market (the “dominant bank effect”,
Ross, 2007). Experience, skills and reputation can be acquired through more
intense participation in deals but also through less participation but greater
stakes of syndicated loans. I expect a negative impact of both of these mea-
sures on the deal arrangement duration. Reputable and experienced leaders
can enhance monitoring and ability to attract participants, signal borrower
and deal quality, and reduce agency costs (Goplan et al., 2007). Indeed, as
the arrangers are responsible for due diligence, allocation of the loan to other
syndicate members, and ex post monitoring, banks in the syndicate will often
rely on the leaders reputation in making lending decisions (Ross, 2007).
I also use several measures of the composition of the syndicate with a
particular focus on the nationality of the lenders. Recent evidence by Carey
8Details regarding the computation of these measures can be found in table 1. The
median value of lenders participation in loan syndications equals 4, while the top 10-th
percentile equals 55. The median value of lenders market share in the syndicated lending
market equals 0.00016, while the top 10-th percentile equals 0.00107. There are 78 top
10 lenders who are the most present and 61 top 10 lenders who have the greatest market
share.
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et al. (1998); Coleman et al. (2002); Hao (2004) also shows that lenders iden-
tity matters for loan terms. Furthermore, Tykvova and Schertler (2008) find
that physical distance between borrowers and lenders impacts information-
related transaction costs, which are important drivers of successful syndica-
tion. Moreover, previous experience in the geographic area is an important
driver for choosing syndicate members by the arranger, in order to mitigate
informational frictions regarding the borrower as well as between the lenders
of the syndicate (Champagne and Kryzanowski, 2007; Sufi, 2007). I compute
the percentage of lenders in the syndicate that are from the same country
as the borrower, differentiating lenders regarding their titles (and thus their
ranks), and classifying them into three broad categories9: top (i.e. leaders
of the syndicate), mid (i.e. managers of the syndicate), and low (i.e. par-
ticipants of the syndicate) lenders. I also measure the percentage of lenders
classified as low and top, as well as low and mid, who are from the same
country. Here, I focus on the titles of the lenders and I consider them as
signals of their importance in the hierarchy of the syndicate10.
This leads to four additional variables labeled Same country top-lender,
Same country-mid lender, Same country mid-low lenders, and Same country
top-low lenders11. The most evident argument behind these measures is
related to informational asymmetries and therefore their impact on agency
costs. Being from the same country as the borrower gives the lender a better
9Classification of lenders is described in table 1.
10The aggregation of the titles into three categories is based on Taylor and Sansone
(2007).
11I do not use other measures such as the percentage of low lenders in the syndicate who
are from the same country as the borrower because such percentage is usually very close
to 100 percent. For the same reasons, I do not use the percentage of low and mid lenders
who are from the same country within the syndicate.
9
insight into various features (the economic, legal and political environment,
the borrower profile, the industry sector, the daily business and the growth
opportunities) that should reduce informational frictions in the syndicate and
essentially allow for a shorter deal arrangement.
However, the sign and magnitude of these measures are relatively unclear.
On the one hand, greater percentage of lenders from the same country as the
borrower, whatever their position in the syndicate hierarchy, should reduce
the duration. Indeed, information sharing can be more efficient if the lenders
come from the same country. This helps to overcome important informational
frictions within the syndicate, regarding both the members and the borrower.
Furthermore, comparative advantages in terms of financing and information
sharing are expected to grow with such syndicate composition, i.e. where
lenders are from the same country.
On the other hand, a greater proximity between the top lenders and the
borrower may exacerbate adverse selection problems, if the informational
gain of the top lenders is not shared with other lenders. It is plausible that
a greater percentage of top and low lenders from the same country might
exacerbate potential informational problems from the managers perspective
and thus increase agency costs of syndication, and in consequence slow down
deal arrangement duration. It might also signal potential collusive behavior
of these type of lenders and enhance the expropriation risk of other lenders.
In case of borrower’s distress, such composition of the syndicate can leave
the other lenders with unsatisfactory solutions. In that case, we can observe
a positive influence of these variables on the deal arrangement duration.
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2.3 Loan and country control variables
I also take several loan and country control variables into account, following
previous literature (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Esty and Megginson, 2003;
Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Ackert et al., 2007; Sufi, 2007; Godlewski and
Weill, 2008).
I take main loan characteristics such as the logarithm of loan size (Loan
size), lenders’ compensation (Spread and Fee), loan maturity (Maturity),
presence of a guarantor (Guarantors), covenants (Covenants), and debt se-
niority (Senior debt) into account. To control for the impact of publicly
available information I include a dummy variable S&P Rating equal to one
if a Standard and Poor’s senior debt rating is available. I also control for the
type and purpose of the loan, benchmark rate, facility issue year, geographi-
cal area, and industry. In order to take legal risk into account, I include the
protection of creditor rights (Creditor Rights) and law enforcement (Rule of
Law) indexes provided by Djankov et al. (2007) and LaPorta et al. (1997).
3 Methodology and data
The econometric methodology employed to investigate the determinants of
the loan arrangement duration as well as the data are presented in this sec-
tion. I begin by introducing terminology common to survival analysis and
describe hazard function estimators. Then I present the sample and descrip-
tive statistics.
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3.1 Econometric specification
Since the dependent variable is the duration of a syndicated loan arrange-
ment, the appropriate methodology is survival analysis which is used to an-
alyze data in which the time until the event is of interest, called an event
time.
Survival data are generally described and modeled in terms of two related
functions12, namely the survival and hazard functions respectively. Let T
represent the duration of time that passes before the occurrence of a certain
random event. Here T is the loan arrangement duration and S(t) the survival
probability that the syndication process lasts from the time origin (launching
date) to a future time t, and is defined as
S(t) = Prob(T ≥ t) = 1− F (t), (1)
where F (t) is the cumulative distribution function for T .
The hazard is usually denoted by h(t) (also called instantaneous event
rate) and is the rate of transition of the syndicated loan arrangement to
completion, given it has not been completed before. The hazard function is
defined formally by
h(t) = lim∆t→0
Prob(t ≤ T < t+∆t|T ≥ t)
∆t
=
f(t)
S(t)
, (2)
where f(t) is the probability density function of T evaluated at t. Since
δS(t)
δt
= − f(t)
S(t)
, the hazard function can be expressed as
12See Kiefer (1988) and Harrell (2001) for a detailed description of survival analysis.
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h(t) = −
δ logS(t)
δt
, (3)
the negative of the slope of the log of the survival function.
When estimating hazard functions, we need to assume a hazard func-
tion specification. The latter can use parametric survival models known as
accelerated failure time (AFT) models13. An AFT model specifies that the
predictors act multiplicatively on the event time or additively on the log of
event time. The effect of a predictor is to alter the rate at which the loan
arrangement proceeds along time axis.
In this framework, the natural logarithm of the survival time ln(t) is
expressed as a linear function of the covariates X :
ln(t) = a+X ′β + ǫ, (4)
where a is the intercept and ǫ is the error term with density f(t). The
distributional form of the error term determines the regression model14. The
hazard function in an AFT model can be written as
h(t) = h0 exp(a+X
′β)(1 + exp(a+X ′β)t), (5)
where h0 is the baseline hazard rate. The hazard function is estimated
13Another possibility is to use the proportional hazards (PH) model, where h(t) =
h0(t) exp(X
′β), given the predictors X and the baseline hazard rate h0(t). The latter
can be left unspecified and estimated using the Cox’s semiparametric partial likelihood
(Cox, 1972, 1975) or take a specific parametric form such as Weibull or exponential dis-
tributions. Within this approach, the hazards are supposed to be proportional over time.
This assumption is strongly rejected in our case.
14With normal, logistic, extreme-value and three-parameter gamma density functions,
we obtain respectively log-normal, log-logistic, Weibull and generalized gamma regressions.
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using maximum likelihood methods.
3.2 Data and descriptive statistics
Information on the duration of loan arrangement, syndicate organization,
and loan characteristics come from the Dealscan database, provided by the
Loan Pricing Corporation, Reuters. Data concerning country characteristics
come from LaPorta et al. (1998), and Djankov et al. (2007).
The sample size is determined by information availability on the endoge-
nous and exogenous variables used in the regressions. The endogenous vari-
able is the loan arrangement duration, measured in days since the launching
date until the completion date, when the deal becomes active. I use only
completed syndicated loans and I eliminate the outliers for the endogenous
variable : deals with duration greater than the 99-percentile, equal to 243
days (above 8 months). Therefore, I have a sample of 4, 807 syndicated loans
from 59 countries for the period between 1992 and 2006. Mean loan arrange-
ment duration equals 55.14 days (almost 8 weeks) with a standard deviation
of 37.02 days.
Definitions of variables and descriptive statistics can be found in table 1,
while the distribution of the number of loans and lenders-tranches and mean
loan arrangement duration by country are displayed in table 7.
4 Results and discussion
In this section, I present and discuss the estimations results and provide
some robustness checks. First, I provide estimate results for specifications
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with syndicate size and concentration measures. Second, I discuss the results
obtained with syndicate composition measures only. Third, to check the
robustness of the previous results and to get a deeper insight into the main
syndicate organization characteristics that drive loan arrangement duration,
I provide results including both type of syndicate organization measures in
the regressions, i.e. syndicate size and concentration along with syndicate
composition in terms of nationality. Finally, I present additional robustness
checks.
4.1 Estimations results with syndicate size and con-
centration measures only
As the proportional hazard assumption is strongly rejected with Schoenfled
residuals tests, I estimate an AFT model assuming a generalized gamma
distribution, as the latter provides the lowest log likelihood, as well as Akaike
and Schwarz information criterions. Results for specifications with syndicate
size and concentration measures only are displayed in table 2.
First of all, most of the variables of interest exhibit statistically significant
coefficients, suggesting that syndicate organization has an economic impact
on loan arrangement duration.
As expected, a greater number of arrangers and their concentration signif-
icantly reduces the loan arrangement duration (specifications (1.1) and (1.2)).
As larger syndicate “cores” allow for a more efficient handling of agency prob-
lems related to syndication, the duration of loan arrangement is significantly
reduced. Furthermore, a greater percentage of reputable and experienced
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lenders also significantly reduces the syndication process (specification (1.3
and (1.4)). Greater percentage of experienced and reputable lenders having
important market shares matters more for quick deal arrangement as the co-
efficient of the Top 10 lenders (market) variable is the greatest. What seems
to really matter for a quick and thus efficient loan syndication arrangement
is the presence of established lenders on the syndicated lending market and
the concentration of arrangers rather than the presence of frequent players
on the syndicated lending market. When arrangers retain significant shares
of the loan (whatever their reputation and experience), it provides an impor-
tant signal regarding the quality of the borrower and of the deal, and thus
allows to provide funds more quickly to the borrower.
4.2 Estimations results with syndicate composition mea-
sures only
I now turn to the discussion of the results obtained with syndicate composi-
tion measures only, displayed in table 3.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Most of the variables exhibit statistically significant coefficients, suggest-
ing that syndicate composition, along with loan and country characteristics,
have an economic impact on loan arrangement duration15.
The arguments on potential collusion problems seem to be validated as
Same country top-lender exhibit positive coefficients in specifications (2.1)
15Due to the correlation structure, Same country mid-low lenders and Same country
top-low lenders cannot be included in the same regression.
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and (2.2), while Same country mid-lender has a negative influence on the
duration. Within syndicate composition also has a significant impact on
duration, as Same country mid-low lenders bears a negative coefficient sign.
As top lenders are usually borrower relationship banks or established in-
stitutions on the syndicated lending market, they usually have access to priv-
ileged information, that might be used against other members of the syndi-
cate. This can exacerbate agency costs and thus make the deal arrangement
longer. This adverse effect of Same country top-lender is somehow mitigated
in specification (2.2) when taking Same country mid-lender into account,
but still remains. A greater percentage of syndicate “managers” from the
same country has a benefic impact on duration as the coefficient exhibit a
significantly negative sign, as expected. Finally, a greater percentage of close
mid and low lenders in terms of nationality significantly reduces the duration
due to better information sharing between “managers” and participants. The
greatest coefficient and thus the most important economic magnitude is for
the Same country top-lender variable.
Following these first results, syndicate organization matters for deal ar-
rangement duration, especially presence of important players of the syndi-
cated lending market and arrangers concentration which allows to signifi-
cantly speed up the syndication process and thus provide the borrower with
necessary funds in a short amount of time. Borrowing from a syndicate that
is composed of a large number of top lenders from the same country as the
borrower does not guarantee fast deal arrangement, while an important pres-
ence of “‘managers” from the same country as the borrower, as well as a large
percentage of participants and “managers” from the same country, provides
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benefits in terms of timing to the borrower who obtains funds more quickly.
4.3 Estimations results with syndicate size, concentra-
tion, and composition measures
Now I include both types of syndicate organization measures in the regres-
sions, i.e. syndicate size and concentration along with syndicate composition
in terms of nationality, to check the robustness of the previous results as well
as to get a deeper insight into the main syndicate design features that drives
deal arrangement duration. Results are displayed in tables 4, 5, and 616.
Results remain robust, as all coefficients for the syndicate organization
variables remain significant and with the same signs as in tables 2 and 3.
Number of arrangers and both measures of Top 10 lenders are always signif-
icantly negative, while syndicate composition variables exhibit same coeffi-
cients as in table 3. However, the magnitude of the coefficients is affected. For
instance, if we compare specification (1.1b) to specifications (1.1) and (2.2),
the coefficients of Same country top-lender and Same country mid-lender
change from 0.1075 and −0.1055 to 0.1757 and −0.1955 respectively. This
effect is more prominent when comparing the Same country mid-low lenders
coefficients in specifications (1.1c) and (2.3), as it changes from −0.0505 to
−0.2875. This suggests that the syndicate composition effect on loan ar-
rangement duration is reinforced when taking syndicate concentration into
account. This effect is far less pronounced when looking at the results in
16I do not display any results with the Concentration of arrangers variable because of
convergence problems when estimating the model with this variable and syndicate com-
position measures.
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tables 5 and 6 where coefficients signs for Top 10 lenders and syndication
composition variables have similar magnitude when compared to those in
tables 2 and 3.
Overall, conclusions drawn from the results obtained in tables 2 and 3
remain. Syndicate organization matters for deal arrangement duration, which
can be significantly reduced provided a larger number of arrangers, who retain
larger shares of the loan, and are more reputable and experienced lenders on
the syndicated lending market. These are the most important features to
be taken by the borrower into account if his main interest is for short deal
arrangement duration in order to access the necessary funds quickly.
4.4 Robustness checks
I have performed several robustness checks regarding the use of alternative
variables, bounding the endogenous variable, and applying other estimation
methods and procedures.
I obtain very similar results when considering the top 5-th percentile of the
most frequent lenders and most important lenders in terms of market share17
for the syndicate reputation measure or using the percentage of all lenders
in the syndicate from the same country as the borrower. Furthermore, when
performing all the regressions on a reduced sample with elimination of deal
arrangement durations over 100 and 200 days respectively does not alter my
results. Coefficients remain significant with the same signs, although their
magnitude is slightly reduced. Also, for all the estimations obtained with a
17There are 58 top 5 lenders (presence) and 34 top 5 lenders (market). The values of
the top 5-th percentile for these two variables are equal to 118 and 0.0011 respectively.
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gamma model, the magnitude and the significance of the covariates are very
similar to those obtained with Weibull, log-logistic and log-normal models.
Estimation results on a sub sample excluding borrowers from Asia Pacific
countries, which are the most present in the full sample, lead to very similar
results.
I have also performed a two-step procedure in order to address the poten-
tial endogeneity issue between the duration and the syndicate organization18.
The two steps consist of:
Step 1: regressing the various syndicate organization measures, in particu-
lar Number of arrangers, Concentration of arrangers, Top 10 lenders
(presence), and Top 10 lenders (market) on a set of explanatory vari-
ables which are mainly the loan characteristics already used in the es-
timations, following empirical evidence by Lee and Mullineaux (2004);
Franc¸ois and Missionier-Piera (2007); Sufi (2007);
Step 2: regressing the deal arrangement duration on the estimated syndicate
organization measure from step 1, compensation terms, and country
characteristics.
I use OLS regressions with heteroscedastic standard errors clustered at the
borrower level in step 1 and the same AFT model with gamma distribution
in step 2 as before. Results from step 1 are consistent with existing empirical
evidence by Lee and Mullineaux (2004); Sufi (2007), i.e. syndicate are larger
and more diffuse when the loan size is greater, the maturity is longer, and
18In order to not overload the paper I do not provide these results but they are available
upon request.
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when the lenders are better protected (presence of guarantors, covenants, and
debt seniority). Results from step 2 are very similar to those obtained with
a simple AFT regression regarding the coefficients significance and sign for
syndicate organization measures, although their magnitude is modified. For
instance, Number of arrangers bears a coefficient of −0.0185 in specification
(1.1) of table 2, while it changes to −0.093 when using a two step procedure.
Therefore, results regarding the influence of syndicate organization on deal
arrangement duration hold.
5 Conclusion
Using a sample of more than 4, 800 syndicated loans from 59 countries in the
period 1992− 2006, I have employed accelerated failure time models to test
the influence of the syndicate organization on the loan arrangement duration,
measured in days since the syndication launching date until the completion
date when the loan contract is signed. I measure syndicate organization with
various characteristics related to syndicate size, concentration, and composi-
tion, as well as lenders nationality.
Empirical results show that syndicate organization clearly matters for deal
arrangement duration. In particular, arranger’s market share and concentra-
tion are crucial inputs allowing to significantly speed up the syndication pro-
cess and thus provide the borrower with necessary funds in a shorter amount
of time. Indeed, concentration of experienced and reputable arrangers pro-
vide an efficient signal regarding handling the syndication process and the
agency problems steaming from it. Furthermore, the duration is shorter
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when an important share of “managers” in the syndicate are from the same
country as the borrower, as well as when a large percentage of participants
and “managers” are the same country. This result receives an interpretation
related to the reduction of informational frictions with the syndicate when
such composition is at work. On the contrary, borrowing from a syndicate
that is composed of a large number of top lenders from the same country as
the borrower does not guarantee fast deal arrangement, because of potential
expropriation and collusion issues, as well as exacerbated agency problems
with such organization.
Overall, deal arrangement duration can be significantly reduced provided
a larger number of arrangers, who retain larger shares of the loan, and are
more reputable and experienced lenders on the syndicated lending market.
These are the most important features to be taken into account by the bor-
rower if his main interest is for short deal arrangement duration in order
to access the necessary funds quickly. Thus, the syndicate organization is
an important input for corporate finance decisions and should be carefully
analyzed by the borrower but also by the lenders. Finally, these results con-
tribute to the existing literature on the importance of syndicate organization
for successful and value enhancing loan syndication.
References
Ackert, L., Huang, R., Ramirez, G., 2007. Information opacity, credit risk,
and the design of loan contracts for private firms. Financial Markets, In-
stitutions and Instruments 16, 221–242.
Altunbas, Y., Gadanecz, B., Kara, A., 2005. Key factors affecting interna-
22
tionally active banks’ decisions to participate in loan syndications. Applied
Economic Letters 12, 249–253.
Bolton, P., Scharfstein, D., 1996. Optimal debt structure and the number of
creditors. Journal of Political Economy 104, 1–25.
Carey, M., Post, M., Sharpe, S., 1998. Does corporate lending by banks
and finance companies differ? evidence on specialization in private debt
contracting. Journal of Finance 53, 845–878.
Champagne, C., Kryzanowski, L., 2007. Are current syndicated loan alliances
related to past alliances? Journal of Banking and Finance 31, 3145–3161.
Coleman, A., Esho, N., Sharpe, I., 2002. Do bank characteristics influence
loan contract terms ? Working paper.
Cox, D., 1972. Regression models and life tables. Journal of the Royal Sta-
tistical Society 24, 187–201.
Cox, D., 1975. Partial likelihood. Biometrika 62, 269–276.
Dennis, S., Mullineaux, D., 2000. Syndicated loans. Journal of Financial
Intermediation 9, 404–426.
Djankov, S., McLiesh, C., Shleifer, A., 2007. Private credit in 129 countries.
Journal of Financial Economics 84, 299–329.
Eisenhardt, K. M., 1989. Making fast strategic decisions in high-velocity
environments. The Academy of Management Journal 32, 543–576.
Esty, B., 2001. Structuring loan syndicates: A case study of the hong kong
disneyland project loan. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 14, 80–95.
Esty, B., Megginson, W., 2003. Creditor rights, enforcement, and debt owner-
ship structure: Evidence from the global syndicated loan market. Journal
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, 37–59.
Focarelli, D., Pozzolo, A., Casolaro, L., 2008. The pricing effect of certifica-
tion on syndicated loans. Journal of Monetary Economics 55, 335–349.
Franc¸ois, P., Missionier-Piera, F., 2007. The agency structure of loan syndi-
cates. The Financial Review 42, 227–245.
Gatev, E., Strahan, P., 2008. Liquidity risk and syndicate structure. Working
Paper 13802, National Bureau of Economic Research.
23
Gatti, S., Kleimeier, S., Megginson, W., Steffanoni, A., 2008. Arranger cer-
tification in project finance. Working paper.
Godlewski, C., Weill, L., 2008. Syndicated loans in emerging markets. Emerg-
ing Markets Review 9, 206–219.
Goplan, R., Nanda, V., Yerramilli, V., 2007. Lead arranger reputation and
the loan syndication market. Working paper.
Hao, L., 2004. Bank effects and the determinants of loan yield spreads. Work-
ing paper.
Harjoto, M., Mullineaux, D., Yi, H.-C., 2006. A comparison of syndicated
loan pricing at investment and commercial banks. Financial Management
35, 49–70.
Harrell, F., 2001. Regression Modeling Strategies With Applications to Lin-
ear Models, Logistic Regression, and Survival Analysis. Springer Series in
Statistics.
Ivashina, V., 2007. Asymmetric information effects on syndicated loan rates.
Working paper, Harvard Business School.
Jones, J., Lang, W. W., Nigro, P. J., 2005. Agent behavior in bank loan
syndications. Journal of Financial Research 28, 385–402.
Kiefer, N., 1988. Econometric duration data and hazard functions. Journal
of Economic Literature 25, 646–679.
LaPorta, R., de Silanes, F. L., Shleifer, A., 1998. Law and finance. Journal
of Political Economy 106, 1113–1155.
LaPorta, R., de Silanes, F. L., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1997. Legal determi-
nants of external finance. Journal of Finance 52, 1130–1150.
Lee, S., Mullineaux, D., 2004. Monitoring, financial distress, and the struc-
ture of commercial lending syndicates. Financial Management 33, 107–130.
Panyagometh, K., Roberts, G., 2008. Loan syndicate structure: Evidence
from ex post risk. Working paper.
Pichler, P., Wilhelm, W., 2001. A theory of the syndicate: Form follows
function. Journal of Finance 56, 2237–2264.
24
Preece, D., Mullineaux, D., 1996. Monitoring, loan renegotiability, and firm
value: The role of lending syndicates. Journal of Banking and Finance 20,
577–593.
Ross, D., 2007. The “dominant bank effect”: How high lender reputation
affects the information content and terms of bank loans’. Working paper.
Sufi, A., 2007. Information asymmetry and financing arrangements: Evidence
from syndicated loans. Journal of Finance 62, 629–668.
Talaulicar, T., Grundei, J., v.Werder, A., 2005. Strategic decision making in
start-ups: the effect of top management team organization and processes
on speed and comprehensiveness. Journal of Business Venturing 20, 519–
541.
Taylor, A., Sansone, A., 2007. The Handbook of Loan Syndications and
Trading. McGraw-Hill.
Tykvova, T., Schertler, A., 2008. Syndication to overcome transaction costs
of cross-border investments? evidence from a worldwide private equity
deals’ dataset. Working paper, ZEW Mannheim.
Weidner, D., January 2000. Syndicated lending closes out 90s on a tear. The
American Banker.
25
Table 1: Variables definition and descriptive statistics
The table provides a brief description and descriptive statistics for variables used in the regressions, with a distinction of
loan, syndicate organization, and country characteristics, as well as control variables. Loan, syndicate organization and
control variables come from Dealscan (LPC, Reuters). Country characteristics come from LaPorta et al. (1998); Djankov
et al. (2007).
Variable Description N Mean Std. dev.
Loan characteristics
Loan arrange-
ment duration
Duration of the syndicated loan arrangement
since the launching date until the completion
date, measured in days.
4807 55.1367 37.0186
Loan size Logarithm of the size of the loan (in million
USD).
4807 18.5816 1.3801
Spread Spread over the benchmark rate, measured in
bps.
4807 110.6984 79.8330
Fee Up front fee measured in bps. 4807 52.6986 43.6978
Maturity Maturity of the loan in months. 4807 53.8417 36.0990
Guarantors = 1 if there is at least one guarantor. 4807 0.0957 0.2942
Covenants = 1 if the loan agreement includes financial
covenants.
4807 0.1157 0.3199
Senior debt = 1 if debt is senior. 4807 0.2528 0.4346
S&P rating = 1 if the borrower has a senior debt rating
by Standard & Poor’s.
4807 0.0616 0.2404
Term loan = 1 if the loan is a term loan. 4807 0.5891 0.4920
Corporate pur-
poses
= 1 if the loan purpose is general corporate
purposes funding.
4807 0.1059 0.3077
Debt repayment = 1 if the loan purpose is debt repayment
funding.
4807 0.1949 0.3962
Working capital = 1 if the loan purpose is working capital
funding.
4807 0.0786 0.2692
Project finance = 1 if the loan purpose is project finance
funding.
4807 0.1009 0.3012
Libor = 1 if the benchmark rate is the Libor. 4807 0.2592 0.4382
Euribor = 1 if the benchmark rate is the Euribor. 4807 0.0811 0.2731
Syndicate organization characteristics
Number of ar-
rangers
Number of arrangers in the syndicate. 4807 3.6004 3.6992
Concentration
of arrangers
Herfindhal index of the loan shares retained
by arrangers.
4530 0.2443 0.2409
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Table 1: (continued)
Variable Description N Mean Std. dev.
Top 10 lenders
(presence)1
Percentage of the syndicate lenders in the top
10-th centile of the most frequent lenders in
the sample.
4530 0.6925 0.2085
Top 10 lenders
(market)2
Percentage of the syndicate lenders in the top
10-th centile regarding market share of syn-
dicated loans in the sample.
4530 0.0684 0.1391
Same country
top lenders
Percentage of the syndicate ’top lenders’3
from the same country as the borrower.
4530 0.3078 0.2295
Same country
mid lenders
Percentage of the syndicate ’mid lenders’4 the
same country as the borrower.
4530 0.9199 0.1288
Same country
mid-low lenders
Percentage of the syndicate ’mid’ and ’low’5
lenders from the same country.
4530 0.8554 0.1748
Same country
top-low lenders
Percentage of the syndicate ’top’ and ’low’
lenders from the same country.
4530 0.0917 0.1365
Country characteristics
Creditor rights An index aggregating four aspects of cred-
itor rights. The index ranges from zero
(weak creditor rights) to four (strong credi-
tor rights)
3782 2.7343 0.9635
Rule of law An index indicating the law enforcement.
The index ranges from zero (weak enforce-
ment) to ten (strong enforcement)
4245 6.9136 2.0854
1: I count the number of times a particular lender participates in a syndicated loan in the sample and I use the 90-th
percentile of its distribution to distinguish top lenders for participation intensity. Then I compute the percentage of such
top lenders in a syndicate for every deal.
2: I compute for each lender the sum of all syndicated loans shares funded per year and I divide this number by the sum
of syndicated loans per year in the sample. I use the 90-th percentile of the distribution of this variable to distinguish top
lenders for market shares. Then I compute the percentage of these lenders in a syndicate for every deal.
3: Lenders are classified as ’top’ if they bear the following titles in the syndicate: administrative agent, agent, arranger,
bookrunner, lead arranger, mandated arranger, senior arranger, underwriter, lead bank, joint arranger, managing agent,
senior managing agent, syndication agent, co-agent, co-arranger, senior co-arranger, sub-underwriter, co-lead arranger,
co-syndication agent, co-underwriter.
4: Lenders are classified as ’mid’ if they bear the following titles in the syndicate: lead manager, senior lead manager,
co-lead manager, expanded lead manager, senior co-lead manager, manager, co-manager, senior manager.
5: Lenders are classified as ’low’ if they bear the following titles in the syndicate: participant, lender, senior lender.
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Table 2: Estimation results with syndicate size and concentration measures
only
The table provides estimation results of the accelerated failure time model with a gamma distribution
for different specifications (1.1 to 1.4) in terms of syndicate organization measures. The dependent
variable is Loan arrangement duration. Definition of variables appear in table 1. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ correspond to coefficients significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and
10% level. Loan type, loan purpose, benchmark rate, facility active year, industry and geographical
areas dummies included but not reported.
Specifications (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4)
Number of arrangers -0.0185∗∗∗
(0.0022)
Concentration of arrangers -0.2899∗∗∗
(0.0768)
Top 90 lenders (presence) -0.1556∗∗∗
(0.026)
Top 90 lenders (market) -0.3731∗∗
(0.1502)
Loan size 0.0193∗∗ -0.0291∗∗∗ -0.0246∗∗∗ -0.0265∗∗∗
(0.0098) (0.009) (0.007) (0.0067)
Spread 0.0006∗∗ 0.0005 -0.0004∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Fee -0.0007 -0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Maturity 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗ 0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Guarantors 0.0911∗∗∗ 0.0088 0.0291∗ 0.0421∗∗
(0.0221) (0.0287) (0.0167) (0.0191)
Covenants 0.1126∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.0677∗∗∗ 0.0656∗∗∗
(0.0213) (0.0205) (0.0127) (0.013)
Senior debt 0.1199 1.0468∗∗∗ -0.1251 -0.2349∗∗∗
(0.0821) (0.0796) (0.0794) (0.0657)
S&P rating 0.2562 -0.5874∗∗∗ 0.0176 0.016
(0.471) (0.0442) (0.04) (0.0387)
Creditor rights 0.0998∗∗∗ 0.0109 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0359∗∗∗
(0.0094) (0.0214) (0.0091) (0.0092)
Rule of law -0.1539∗∗∗ 0.1661∗∗∗ 0.0052 -0.0016
(0.0152) (0.0324) (0.0134) (0.0136)
Intercept -32.2318∗∗∗ -8.3350 -37.9221∗∗∗ -27.4776∗∗∗
(11.3297) (8.5718) (7.2874) (7.2863)
N 3274 2596 3274 3274
Chi2 2171.887 6713.32 8350.457 4377.683
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Table 3: Estimation results with syndicate composition measures only
The table provides estimation results of the accelerated failure time model with a gamma distribution for
different specifications (2.1 to 2.4) in terms of syndicate organization measures. The dependent variable
is Loan arrangement duration. Definition of variables appear in table 1. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ correspond to coefficients significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Loan type, loan purpose, benchmark rate, facility active year, industry and geographical areas dummies
included but not reported.
Specifications (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4)
Same country top lenders 0.1388∗∗∗ 0.1075∗∗∗
(0.0275) (0.0274)
Same country mid lenders -0.1055∗∗∗
(0.0386)
Same country mid-low lenders -0.0505∗∗
(0.0242)
Same country top-low lenders 0.0466
(0.0356)
Loan size -0.0232∗∗∗ -0.0248∗∗∗ -0.0264∗∗∗ -0.0276∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.0065) (0.0064)
Spread -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Fee 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Maturity 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Guarantors 0.04∗∗ 0.0455∗∗∗ 0.0317∗ 0.0295∗
(0.016) (0.0159) (0.0167) (0.0163)
Covenants 0.0548∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.0623∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗∗
(0.0133) (0.0133) (0.013) (0.0131)
Senior debt -0.1403∗∗ -0.1504∗∗ -0.1319∗ -0.1401∗
(0.0713) (0.0724) (0.0773) (0.0801)
S&P rating 0.0141 0.0187 0.0235 0.026
(0.035) (0.0351) (0.0371) (0.0372)
Creditor rights 0.0418∗∗∗ 0.0418∗∗∗ 0.0373∗∗∗ 0.0383∗∗∗
(0.0087) (0.0083) (0.0089) (0.009)
Rule of law 0.0153 0.0075 -0.0040 -0.0054
(0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0133)
Intercept -27.6439∗∗∗ -32.5827∗∗∗ -28.1710∗∗∗ -28.2415∗∗∗
(6.6182) (6.9538) (6.9599) (7.1009)
N 3274 3274 3274 3274
Chi2 7349.766 7970.226 7857.641 8143.089
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Table 4: Estimation results with syndicate size and concentration (Arrangers)
measures and syndicate composition measures
The table provides estimation results of the accelerated failure time model with a gamma distribution
for different specifications (1.1a to 1.1d) in terms of syndicate organization measures. The dependent
variable is Loan arrangement duration. Definition of variables appear in table 1. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ correspond to coefficients significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and
10% level. Loan type, loan purpose, benchmark rate, facility active year, industry and geographical
areas dummies included but not reported.
Specifications (1.1a) (1.1b) (1.1c) (1.1d)
Number of arrangers -0.0162∗∗∗ -0.0161∗∗∗ -0.0170∗∗∗ -0.0182∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Same country top lenders 0.2139∗∗∗ 0.1757∗∗∗
(0.0397) (0.0406)
Same country mid lenders -0.1955∗∗∗
(0.0647)
Same country mid-low -0.2875∗∗∗
(0.0425)
Same country top-low 0.2843∗∗∗
(0.0556)
Loan size 0.0284∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.0316∗∗∗ 0.0281∗∗∗
(0.0098) (0.01) (0.0092) (0.0098)
Spread 0.0006∗∗ 0.0008∗∗ 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Fee -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0008
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Maturity 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Guarantors 0.1102∗∗∗ 0.1269∗∗∗ 0.1172∗∗∗ 0.1203∗∗∗
(0.0221) (0.0236) (0.023) (0.0234)
Covenants 0.0766∗∗∗ 0.0786∗∗∗ 0.0891∗∗∗ 0.0947∗∗∗
(0.0219) (0.0217) (0.0221) (0.0213)
Senior debt 0.1264 0.1138 0.1558∗ 0.1111
(0.0866) (0.0935) (0.0803) (0.0933)
S&P rating 0.2401 0.2463 0.2372 0.2668
(0.441) (0.426) (0.458) (0.447)
Creditor rights 0.1049∗∗∗ 0.1028∗∗∗ 0.1008∗∗∗ 0.1006∗∗∗
(0.0094) (0.0092) (0.0093) (0.0092)
Rule of law -0.1247∗∗∗ -0.1290∗∗∗ -0.1368∗∗∗ -0.1452∗∗∗
(0.0154) (0.0151) (0.0161) (0.0153)
Intercept -35.4757∗∗∗ -44.9626∗∗∗ -44.8021∗∗∗ -46.5379∗∗∗
(10.8001) (11.6281) (11.9105) (12.2271)
N 3274 3274 3274 3274
Chi2 2360.716 2473.53 2183.467 2419.181
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Table 5: Estimation results with syndicate size and concentration (Top 10
lenders (presence)) measures and syndicate composition measures
The table provides estimation results of the accelerated failure time model with a gamma distribution
for different specifications (1.3a to 1.3d) in terms of syndicate organization measures. The dependent
variable is Loan arrangement duration. Definition of variables appear in table 1. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ correspond to coefficients significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10%
level. Loan type, loan purpose, benchmark rate, facility active year, industry and geographical areas
dummies included but not reported.
Specifications (1.3a) (1.3b) (1.3c) (1.3d)
Top 10 lenders (presence) -0.1218∗∗∗ -0.1147∗∗∗ -0.1560∗∗∗ -0.1537∗∗∗
(0.0281) (0.0293) (0.0283) (0.0279)
Same country top lenders 0.1109∗∗∗ 0.0864∗∗∗
(0.0309) (0.0295)
Same country mid lenders -0.0877∗∗
(0.0403)
Same country mid-low lenders 0.0011
(0.0267)
Same country top-low lenders 0.011
(0.0376)
Loan size -0.0215∗∗∗ -0.0229∗∗∗ -0.0246∗∗∗ -0.0245∗∗∗
(0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0068) (0.0069)
Spread -0.0004∗∗ -0.0004∗∗ -0.0004∗∗ -0.0004∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Fee 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0012∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Maturity 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0004∗∗ 0.0004∗∗ 0.0004∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Guarantors 0.0402∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.029∗ 0.0301∗
(0.016) (0.0159) (0.0166) (0.0163)
Covenants 0.0568∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.0679∗∗∗ 0.0669∗∗∗
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0132) (0.0132)
Senior debt -0.1309∗ -0.1393∗ -0.1252 -0.1261
(0.0746) (0.0764) (0.079) (0.0814)
S&P rating 0.0095 0.0137 0.0177 0.0172
(0.0371) (0.0373) (0.0394) (0.0394)
Creditor rights 0.0405∗∗∗ 0.0408∗∗∗ 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0369∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.0087) (0.0092) (0.0094)
Rule of law 0.0195 0.0127 0.0052 0.0052
(0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0134)
Intercept -36.7240∗∗∗ -40.4002∗∗∗ -37.8967∗∗∗ -38.3784∗∗∗
(7.0882) (7.2511) (7.3020) (7.3876)
N 3274 3274 3274 3274
Chi2 7885.444 8439.457 8408.059 8414.194
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Table 6: Estimation results with syndicate size and concentration (Top 10
lenders (market)) measures and syndicate composition measures
The table provides estimation results of the accelerated failure time model with a gamma distribution
for different specifications (1.4a to 1.4d) in terms of syndicate organization measures. The dependent
variable is Loan arrangement duration. Definition of variables appear in table 1. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ correspond to coefficients significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10%
level. Loan type, loan purpose, benchmark rate, facility active year, industry and geographical areas
dummies included but not reported.
Specifications (1.4a) (1.4b) (1.4c) (1.4d)
Top 10 lenders (market) -0.3595∗∗ -0.3714∗∗ -0.3707∗∗ -0.3807∗∗
(0.1626) (0.1718) (0.152) (0.1539)
Same country top lenders 0.1294∗∗∗ 0.0955∗∗∗
(0.0298) (0.031)
Same country mid lenders -0.1101∗∗∗
(0.0376)
Same country mid-low lenders -0.0455
(0.0444)
Same country top-low lenders 0.0528
(0.033)
Loan size -0.0208∗∗∗ -0.0223∗∗∗ -0.0248∗∗∗ -0.0256∗∗∗
(0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0065)
Spread -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Fee 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Maturity 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Guarantors 0.0575∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗∗ 0.0481∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.019) (0.0195) (0.0192) (0.0192)
Covenants 0.0518∗∗∗ 0.0492∗∗∗ 0.0599∗∗∗ 0.0611∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0135)
Senior debt -0.2258∗∗∗ -0.2364∗∗∗ -0.2310∗∗∗ -0.2397∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.0646) (0.0652) (0.0675)
S&P rating 0.0001 0.0038 0.0113 0.0119
(0.0368) (0.0371) (0.0383) (0.0384)
Creditor rights 0.0396∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.0359∗∗∗ 0.0371∗∗∗
(0.0092) (0.0088) (0.0092) (0.0092)
Rule of law 0.018 0.0096 0.00007 -0.0012
(0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0137) (0.0136)
Intercept -29.8470∗∗∗ -35.5837∗∗∗ -29.7993∗∗∗ -30.6405∗∗∗
(7.1059) (7.5837) (7.4394) (7.6857)
N 3274 3274 3274 3274
Chi2 4279.283 4509.396 4436.914 4403.339
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Table 7: Distribution of the number of loans and lenders-tranches,
and mean loan arrangement duration by country
The table provides the number of loans and lenders-tranches, as well as respective in sample frequency, by country,
as well as mean values of the endogenous variable Loan arrangement duration by borrower country.
Country Number of Freq. Loan arrangement Number of Freq.
loans duration lenders-tranches
Argentina - - - 10 0.03
Australia 172 3.58 63.61 158 0.55
Austria 3 0.06 51.33 924 3.21
Bahrain 11 0.23 37.81 297 1.03
Belgium 21 0.44 49.52 744 2.59
Bermuda 2 0.04 56.00 - -
Bulgaria 2 0.04 43.00 - -
Canada - - - 543 1.89
Cayman Islands 10 0.21 48.00 - -
China 350 7.28 59.99 101 0.35
Croatia 10 0.21 46.20 16 0.06
Cyprus - - - 16 0.06
Czech Republic 2 0.04 125.00 56 0.19
Denmark 10 0.21 54.3 325 1.13
Egypt 7 0.15 53.00 86 0.30
Finland 14 0.29 39.28 167 0.58
France 167 3.47 52.31 3894 13.54
Germany 117 2.43 53.06 4819 16.76
Ghana 3 0.06 45.33 - -
Greece 7 0.15 63.00 168 0.58
Hong Kong 759 15.79 51.38 409 1.42
Hungary 21 0.44 50.57 154 0.54
Iceland 4 0.08 41.25 19 0.07
India 190 3.95 56.45 48 0.17
Indonesia 525 10.92 61.49 30 0.10
Iran - - - 35 0.12
Ireland 5 0.10 45.00 319 1.11
Israel - - - 74 0.26
Italy 47 0.98 51.95 1593 5.54
Japan 57 1.19 47.26 1906 6.63
Jordan - - - 119 0.41
Kazakhstan 5 0.10 32.00 - -
Korea (South) 616 12.81 32.74 44 0.15
Kuwait 2 0.04 64.00 182 0.63
Latvia - - - 22 0.08
Luxembourg 14 0.29 68.85 334 1.16
Malaysia 151 3.14 70.10 22 0.08
Malta - - - 15 0.05
Morocco - - - 16 0.06
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Table 7: (continued)
Country Number of Freq. Loan arrangement Number of Freq.
loans duration lenders-tranches
Netherlands 61 1.27 57.57 2034 7.07
New Zealand 28 0.58 57.07 - -
Norway 20 0.42 42.10 303 1.05
Oman 5 0.10 116.80 90 0.31
Pakistan 19 0.40 38.47 14 0.05
Papua New Guinea 5 0.10 93.60 - -
Philippines 115 2.39 69.23 - -
Poland 17 0.35 65.82 111 0.39
Portugal 15 0.31 40.53 288 1.00
Qatar 6 0.12 80.83 107 0.37
Romania 8 0.17 47.15 21 0.07
Russian Federation 31 0.64 50.48 44 0.15
Saudi Arabia 4 0.08 18.50 187 0.65
Singapore 155 3.22 54.66 72 0.25
Slovakia 2 0.04 50.50 37 0.13
Slovenia 9 0.19 43.33 13 0.05
South Africa 21 0.44 47.95 74 0.26
Spain 30 0.62 46.76 489 1.70
Sri Lanka 3 0.06 38.33 - -
Sweden 26 0.54 47.65 327 1.14
Switzerland 14 0.29 43.57 396 1.38
Taiwan 293 6.10 86.01 200 0.70
Thailand 395 8.22 56.29 - -
Tunisia 3 0.06 48.00 36 0.13
Turkey 21 0.44 31.71 65 0.23
United Arab Emirates 6 0.12 56.66 296 1.03
United Kingdom 165 3.43 51.57 2701 9.39
United States of America - - - 3047 10.60
Venezuela 3 0.06 113.66 - -
Vietnam 14 0.29 77.92 - -
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